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Still Standing After All These Years:* 
Five Decades of Litigation Under the 
Fair Housing Act and the Supreme 
Court Still Can’t Say for Sure Who Is 
Protected 
 
David A. Logan** 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The 1960s was one of the most turbulent decades in modern 
American history, marred by assassinations, widespread civil 
unrest, and a highly divisive war in Vietnam.1 But it was also a 
decade of important legislative accomplishments,2 including a 
stronger safety net for the poor,3 protection of the environment,4 
 
* With apologies to Paul Simon. 
** Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. Thanks to 
Mike Green, Justin Kishbaugh, Wayne Logan, John Noyes, and Jeanne Wine 
for their helpful comments on an earlier draft and to Nicole Dyszlewski, 
Lucinda Harrison-Cox, and Alisha Hennen for their excellent research 
assistance. 
1. See Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 
2331, 2349 (1993) (“A collage of developments—the Civil Rights movement, 
the Vietnam War and the opposition to it, urban riots—contributed to a 
profound unsettlement about the direction the country was taking.”). Accord 
Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1, 34 (2007) 
(“Urban riots, campus unrest, political violence, and a spate of prominent 
assassinations and multiple murders gripped the nation . . . .”). 
2. See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY 
CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS 1946–1990, at 56–61 (1991) 
(listing major legislation passed 1960–70). 
3. John Charles Boger, Race and the American City: The Kerner 
Commission in Retrospect—An Introduction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1289, 1341 
(1993) (“Of course, since the mid-1960s a number of important noncash 
 
169 
 170 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:169 
 
and bans on discrimination in voting and employment.5 One of  
the less-known of these legislative achievements was the passage 
of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), which made discrimination in 
housing a violation of federal law.6 
Five decades after its passage, the FHA plays a “continuing 
role in moving the Nation toward a more integrated society.”7 
Nevertheless, despite congressional amendment and many federal 
court decisions, important questions about the law remain 
unsettled, not least who can claim it protections. This uncertainty 
was on display in the most recent term of the Supreme Court of 
the United States in  Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami.8  
The next section of this article provides background on the FHA 
and subsequent sections consider the opinions in City of Miami 
and provide a critique of the Court’s analysis. I conclude that 
despite a plaintiff victory in City of Miami, the Court’s convoluted 
torts analysis may have, in effect, overruled three venerable 
precedents and dealt a fatal blow to an important tool for 
combatting housing discrimination. 
I. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
By early 1968, the Civil Rights Movement had secured 
important legislative successes, winning federal statutory 
protection for access to public accommodations, voting rights, and 
equal employment,9 but a key goal—legislation targeting racial 
 
programs have been created or expanded to help low-income recipients, 
including the Food Stamp program, the Medicaid program[,] . . . nutritional 
programs such as the School Lunch Program, and the supplemental food 
program for women, infants, and children (WIC).” (citations omitted)). 
4. The Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 
(1965) (formerly codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1151) (requiring states to adopt water 
quality standards and made the federal government responsible for the 
review and approval of these standards). 
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-1 to a-2; 2000e-3 (2012); 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2012). 
6. The Fair Housing Act (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968), 
Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601– 
3619 (2016)). 
7. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525–26 (2015). Inclusive Cmtys. is discussed in more 
detail infra note 172 and accompanying text. 
8. 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017). 
9.    See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-1 to a-2; 2000e- 
3 (2012); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2012). 
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discrimination in housing—proved even more difficult to achieve. 
Minorities seeking better living conditions were severely 
disadvantaged by an array of misconduct, ranging from obvious 
discrimination, such as refusing to sell or rent property to 
qualified minority home seekers,10 to the more subtle “red lining” 
(making it harder and more expensive for minority buyers to get 
loans)11 and “steering” (channeling minorities to predominately 
minority neighborhoods).12 This discrimination had a negative 
impact on access to jobs, quality education, and even personal 
safety.13 However, the proposed legislation inspired ferocious 
pushback because people care deeply about whom they live near.14 
Indeed, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was pelted with stones when 
 
 
10. Refusal is the “most obvious form of housing discrimination . . . . 
Typically, this refusal is not outright, but rather manifests itself in the form 
of grudging sales techniques that defy common sense and business logic. . . . 
The list of possible delaying tactics and burdensome procedures is endless.” 1 
JOHN P. RELMAN, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION PRACTICE MANUAL § 2.2 (Thomson 
West 2008). 
11. The term “redlining” takes its name from manuals produced by the 
federal Home Owners Loan Corporation that sorted neighborhoods based 
upon perceived credit risk, a conclusion often based upon the presence of, or 
predicted increase in, minority population; black neighborhoods were 
considered the least credit-worthy and colored red. Benjamin Howell, 
Exploiting Race and Space: Concentrated Subprime Lending as Housing 
Discrimination, 94 CAL. L. REV. 101, 107–08 (2006); see also RICHARD 
ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR 
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017) (arguing that conscious 
government policies played an important role in racial segregation in 
housing). 
12. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 366 n.1 (1982) 
(“[R]eal estate brokers and agents preserve and encourage patterns of racial 
segregation in available housing by steering members of racial and ethnic 
groups to buildings occupied primarily by members of such racial and ethnic 
groups and away from buildings and neighborhoods inhabited primarily by 
members of other races or groups.”). The author represented the plaintiffs in 
the Havens Realty case. 
13. See GUNNAR MYRDAL ET AL., AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO 
PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 618 (1944) (“[B]ecause Negro people do 
not live near white people, they cannot . . . associate with each other in many 
activities founded on common neighborhood. Residential segregation . . . 
becomes reflected in uni-racial schools, hospitals and other institutions.”). 
14. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 190–91, 264 (2004) 
(explaining that while whites increasingly opposed racial discrimination in 
voting, public transportation, and higher education, housing segregation was 
widespread and supported by whites in both the North and the South). 
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he marched for fair housing in Chicago, prompting him to remark 
that “I think the people of Mississippi ought to come to Chicago to 
learn how to hate.”15 
The “long hot summer” of 1967, with full-out rioting in cities 
across the country, propelled race relations to the top of the 
national agenda,16 but legislators who covered their racism behind 
the fig leaf of “states’ rights” remained a significant roadblock to 
the passage of legislation banning housing discrimination.17 This 
widespread civil unrest prompted President Lyndon Johnson to 
establish the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 
(the Kerner Commission), a distinguished group of citizens 
appointed to investigate the root causes of the discord and propose 
solutions.18 The Commission reported back on March 1, 1968, and 
concluded that the riots were caused by racism in general and 
housing discrimination in particular.19 The Commission 
specifically recommended the passage of a “comprehensive and 
enforceable federal open-housing law to cover the sale or rental of 
all housing . . . .”20 
Although Senate opponents of fair housing legislation had 
 
 
15. Gene Roberts, Rock Hits Dr. King as Whites Attack March in 
Chicago, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1966, at A1. 
16. Bethany A. Corbin, Should I Stay or Should I Go?: The Future of 
Disparate Impact Liability Under the Fair Housing Act and Implications for 
the Financial Services Industry, 120 PENN. ST. L. REV. 421, 428–29, 428 n.35 
(2015) (recounting that race riots erupted in 164 cities, causing thousands of 
injuries and significant property damage, and were serious enough to require 
deployment of the National Guard). 
17. IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL 
APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 16 
(2014) (“That’s what ‘states’ rights’ defended, though in the language of state- 
federal relations rather than white supremacy. Yet this was enough of a fig 
leaf to allow persons queasy about black equality to oppose integration 
without having to admit, to others and perhaps even to themselves, their 
racial attitudes.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling:  Identity-Based 
Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 472 (2001) 
(“‘[M]oderate’ defenders of apartheid sought to shift the debate from the 
substantive morality of racism to the procedural morality of localism and 
states’ rights.”). 
18. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks Upon Signing Executive 
Order Establishing the Commission (July 29, 1967), in 3 WEEKLY 
COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Aug. 7, 1967, at 1068. 
19. OTTO KERNER ET AL., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION 
ON CIVIL DISORDERS 5 (1968). 
20. Id. at 13. 
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successfully filibustered three times, and withstood some of the 
legendary LBJ arm-twisting21 (he made Air Force jets available to 
senators to get them from their home states to D.C. for a crucial 
vote),22 the momentum created by the riots and the release of the 
Kerner Commission report enabled supporters to corral enough 
votes to send a fair housing bill to the floor of the Senate, and soon 
thereafter the legislation was passed 71–20.23 Nevertheless, the 
prospects for passage in a more conservative House of 
Representatives appeared bleak.24 
Fate intervened, however, in the form of the tragic 
assassination of Dr. King on April 4, 1968, which triggered 
another wave of rioting, and for first time, massive civil unrest 
reached Washington, D.C.25 With portions of the city ablaze, and 
National Guard deployed (troops were even stationed in the 
Capitol building itself), the House rushed to consider the Senate 
bill.26 The crisis provided President Johnson an opening: he urged 
passage of federal fair housing legislation before the burial of Dr. 
King as a fitting memorial to a man who was killed because he 
believed in racial equality.27 The confluence of these dramatic 
 
 
21. Glen O. Robinson, The Electronic First Amendment: An Essay for the 
New Age, 47 DUKE L. J. 899, 923 n.85 (1998) (noting that Johnson was 
“renowned” for his “arm-twisting” and “cajolery”); see also ROBERT A. CARO, 
THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE 588–90 (2002) 
(describing how Johnson gave reluctant Senators “the Johnson treatment”); 
ROWLAND EVANS & ROBERT NOVAK, LYNDON B. JOHNSON: THE EXERCISE OF 
POWER 104 (1966) (“[It was] supplication, accusation, cajolery, exuberance, 
scorn, tears, complaint, the hint of threat . . . . He moved in close, his face a 
scant millimeter from his target, his eyes widening and narrowing, his 
eyebrows rising and falling. From his pockets poured clippings, memos, 
statistics. Mimicry, humor, and the genius of analogy made The Treatment 
an almost hypnotic experience and rendered the target stunned and 
helpless.”). 
22. Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a 
Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149, 155 (1969). 
23. Id. at 158–59. 
24. Corbin, supra note 16, at 430. 
25. JOHN T. ELLIFF, CRIME, DISSENT, AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: THE 
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT IN THE 1960’S, at 112 (Joel B. Grossman ed., Sage Pub., 
Inc. 1971) (“Dr. King’s assassination triggered a wave of rioting in over a 
hundred cities, including serious disorders and widespread property 
destruction in Washington, D.C. . . . .”). 
26. Dubofsky, supra note 22, at 160. 
27. History of Fair Housing, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., http:// 
portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_ 
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events caused the opposition to crumble and debate on the floor 
was limited to a single hour; the House acceded to the Senate bill 
by a 250–171 margin and the President signed the Fair Housing 
Act (FHA) into law the very next day.28 
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, also known as the 
Fair Housing Act of 1968 banned housing discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, religion, and national origin, with the goal of 
replacing residential ghettos with “truly integrated and balanced 
living patterns.”29 The statute provides a damages remedy for any 
“aggrieved person,” defined as “any person who . . . claims to have 
been injured by a discriminatory housing practice.”30 The next 
section discusses the opinions in the Supreme Court’s most recent 
FHA decision, Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, and 
considers who is protected by the statute. 
II. THE DECISION 
Determining exactly who has standing to sue to enforce the 
FHA is complicated by the “protracted and chaotic” circumstances 
surrounding its passage.31 With no committee reports and scant 
floor debate there is little from the congressional record to help 
answer important questions that arise under the Act, including 
who has standing to sue.32 
Three Supreme Court decisions, handed down between 1972 
and 1982, however, read the FHA broadly, granting standing not 
only to minority home seekers, but also to parties who were not 
actually the targets of discrimination, but nevertheless injured as 
a result.33 For example, in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life 
 
opp/aboutfheo/history (last visited Oct. 1, 2017). 
28. Dubofsky, supra note 22, at 160. 
29. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (quoting 114 
CONG. REC. 2706 (statement of Sen. Mondale)). In 1988,  Congress  added 
bans on discrimination on the basis of “sex,” “familial status,” and 
“handicap.” See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1303 
(2017) (discussing congressional actions in 1988). 
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3602(i)(1), 3613(a)(1)(A), 3613(c)(1) (2012). 
31. ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION 
§ 5.2 (Thomson Reuters 2017). 
32. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 210 (“The legislative history of the Act is not 
too helpful.”); see also Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147 (3d 
Cir. 1977) (remarking that the legislative history of FHA is “somewhat 
sketchy”). 
33. See Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212; see also Havens Realty Corp. v. 
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Insurance, the Court allowed white tenants of an apartment 
complex to sue for damage to their right to live in an integrated 
community,34 while in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 
a town was allowed to sue for the tax revenue it lost and the harm 
to its racial balance caused by racial steering.35 Finally, Havens 
Realty Corp. v. Coleman recognized standing for both a civil rights 
group that spent its scarce resources to ferret out housing 
discrimination and for white “testers” who were working 
undercover to obtain evidence that a realtor was engaging in 
racial steering.36 These three standing decisions supported a 
conclusion that the sweep of the FHA is as broad as allowed by 
Article III.37 
Like many municipalities, the City of Miami experienced a 
tidal wave of foreclosures when the housing market collapsed in 
2007–2008. Because of the resulting harm to city coffers, and 
relying upon the favorable FHA precedents, the city filed suit in 
federal district court alleging that lending institutions subjected 
African-American and Latino borrowers to “predatory loans that 
carried more risk, steeper fees and higher costs than those offered 
to identically situated white customers, and created internal 
incentive structures that encouraged employees to provide these 
types of loans.”38 The city claimed that it was an “aggrieved 
 
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 
441 U.S. 91, 111 (1979). 
34. 409 U.S. at 211–12. 
35. 441 U.S. at 110–11. 
36. 455 U.S. at 379. 
37. See David A. Logan, Standing to Sue: A Proposed Separation of 
Powers Analysis, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 37, 42 (1984) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s FHA decisions support the view that Congress has the power to 
“provide judicial redress to parties asserting even novel claims with 
attenuated causal relationships”); see also William A. Fletcher, The Structure 
of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223–24 (1988) (“If a duty is statutory, 
Congress should have essentially unlimited power to define the class of 
persons entitled to enforce that duty, for congressional power to create the 
duty should include the power to define those who have standing to enforce 
it.”). 
38. City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 
2015). The city introduced evidence that African-American borrowers were 
1.6 times more likely to receive a discriminatory loan than a similarly 
situated white borrower and that Latino borrowers were 2.1  times  more 
likely to experience discrimination. Id. at 1268. Unsurprisingly, such 
unfavorable terms resulted in far more minority borrowers being subject to 
foreclosure when the real estate market imploded. Id. at 1268–69. 
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person” within the meaning of the statute because these 
discriminatory practices caused huge numbers of foreclosures in 
predominantly minority neighborhoods,39 resulting in blighted 
areas, lower property tax collections, and higher costs for police, 
fire, and other city services.40 
The district court held that the city lacked standing to sue on 
two grounds: first, the city’s injuries were not in the “zone of 
interests” protected by the FHA and second, any bank misconduct 
was not the “proximate cause” of the injuries alleged by the city.41 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, allowing 
the lawsuit to proceed42 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to hear the banks’ appeal.43 
The Court upheld the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to allow the 
case to proceed by a 5–3 vote, with Justice Breyer writing for the 
majority, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsberg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan.44 Justice Thomas, joined by Justices 
Kennedy and Alito concurred in part and dissented in part.45 
Justice Breyer began his majority opinion by recognizing that 
in order to have standing to sue the plaintiff must show an “injury 
in fact” that is “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s misconduct.46 
This means that when a plaintiff asserts a claim for damages 
under a statute, the plaintiff’s interests must fall within the “zone 
of interests” that Congress intended to protect when passing the 
legislation.47 He then turned to the three earlier FHA decisions— 
Trafficante, Gladstone, and Havens—which he characterized as 
supporting the view that the FHA conferred standing “as broadly 
 
 
 
39. Id. at 1274, 1277–78. 
40. Id. at 1269. 
41. City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 171 F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1319–20 
(S.D. Fla. 2016). 
42. City of Miami, 800 F.3d at 1289. 
43. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1302 (2017). 
44. Id. at 1301. See generally Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on 
the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html (detailing 
the life and unexpected death of Justice Antonin Scalia, creating a sudden 
vacancy on the Supreme Court, and thus, leaving an eight-member court). 
45. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1301. 
46. Id. at 1302 (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 
(2016)). 
47. Id. at 1302–03. 
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as is permi[ssible] by . . . the Constitution.”48 He bolstered this 
conclusion by pointing out that when Congress amended the FHA 
in 1988, it “retained without significant change the definition of 
‘person aggrieved’ that this Court had broadly construed” in the 
trio of Supreme Court decisions.49 
The banks argued that the language from these decisions 
represented dicta and that Congress could not have intended to 
expand statutory protections “to the limits of Article III,” which 
they claimed would mean that literally anybody harmed by a 
discriminatory act would have standing.50 Justice Breyer 
disagreed, countering that the city’s financial injuries “fall within 
the zone of interests that the FHA protects.”51 To support this 
conclusion he pointed to Gladstone, where the Court held that a 
town had standing under the FHA for the depressed housing 
market and the resultant “significant reduction in property values 
[that] directly injures the municipality by diminishing its  tax 
base, thus threatening its ability to bear the costs of local 
government and to provide services.”52 This claim was sufficiently 
analogous to the claim asserted by Miami that the principle of 
stare decisis, plus Congress’ “decision to ratify those precedents” 
while amending the statute in 1988, meant that the city had 
sufficiently alleged injury in fact.53 
The remaining standing question was whether the banks’ 
misconduct was the “proximate cause” of the city’s injuries. The 
Eleventh Circuit had applied a “foreseeability” test and concluded 
that the allegations were sufficient to avoid dismissal because the 
banks had access to “analytical tools as well as published reports 
drawing the link between predatory lending practices ‘and their 
 
 
48. Id. at 1303 (quoting Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205, 209 
(1972)). Justice Breyer noted that similarly expansive language appeared in 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109 (1979) and Havens 
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372, 275–76 (1982). 
49. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1303. 
50. Id. at 1304. “The Banks say it would be similarly farfetched if 
restaurants, plumbers, utility companies or any other participant in the local 
economy could sue the banks for the business they lost when people had to 
give up their homes and leave the neighborhood as a result of the banks’ 
discriminatory lending practices.” Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 1305 (quoting Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 110–11). 
53. Id. 
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attendant harm,’ such as premature foreclosure and the resulting 
costs to the City, including, most notably, a reduction in property 
tax revenues.”54 As a result, even though there were  “several 
links in the causal chain” between the wrongdoing and the city’s 
harms, the appeals court concluded that the injuries were 
sufficiently foreseeable to withstand a motion to dismiss.55 
Justice Breyer rejected this foreseeability-based analysis.56 
He began the majority’s discussion of causation by pointing out 
that FHA claims are a statutory-based version of a tort,57 and 
proximate cause determinations in tort actions that are based 
upon a statute, like the city’s claim, require analysis of the  
“nature of the statutory cause of action.”58 A viable FHA claim 
requires that the injuries alleged cannot be caused by “any remote 
cause,” and the determination of how remote is too remote must  
be based upon whether the harm alleged has “a sufficiently close 
connection to the conduct the statute prohibits.”59 To Justice 
Breyer, “foreseeability alone is not sufficient to establish 
proximate cause under the FHA.”60 
Justice Breyer pointed out that because a housing market is 
“interconnected with economic and social life,” a violation of the 
FHA could “cause ripples of harm to flow” far beyond  a 
defendant’s misconduct.61 In light of this broad and deep 
interconnectedness, Justice Breyer was unwilling to conclude that 
Congress intended the FHA to provide a remedy “wherever the 
ripples travel” because such litigation could be “massive and 
complex,” a possible outcome under the foreseeability test applied 
by the Court of Appeals.62 To avoid this result, a plaintiff must 
 
54. City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262, 1282 (11th Cir. 
2015). The Court of Appeals rejected the banks’ argument that the injury 
had to be the “sole” proximate cause, “direct,” and “not derivative.” Id. at 
1278–82. 
55. Id. at 1282. 
56. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1306. 
57. Id. at 1305 (“A claim for damages under the FHA . . . is akin to a ‘tort 
action.’” (citation omitted)). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 
S. Ct. 1377, 1390 (2014)). 
60. Id. at 1306. 
61. Id. (quoting Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 
U.S. 519, 534 (1983)). 
62. Id. 
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prove a “direct relation between the injury asserted and the 
injurious conduct alleged,”63 and the “general tendency . . . is to 
not go beyond the first step.”64 This, in turn requires an 
assessment of what is “administratively possible and 
convenient.”65 
At this point in the majority opinion, it seemed as if Justice 
Breyer was endorsing the defendant’s argument that the city’s 
claim should be dismissed because “the distance between the 
violation and the harms the City claims to have suffered is simply 
too great.”66 This, however, was not the case, as Justice Breyer 
instead vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
remanded, leaving it to the lower courts to determine whether the 
city’s injuries satisfied the directness test.67 
Justice Thomas, writing for Justices Kennedy and Alito, 
concurred in part and dissented in part.68 As to the “zone of 
interests” question, Justice Thomas argued that the FHA had a 
narrower ambit than that recognized by the majority, and 
analogized the Act to prior standing decisions that had 
significantly limited the class of proper plaintiffs alleging 
employment discrimination under Title VII.69 Characterizing the 
sweeping language in Trafficante, Gladstone, and Havens as “‘ill- 
considered’ dictum leading to ‘absurd consequences,’”70 Justice 
Thomas argued that the interests of Miami were “markedly 
distinct” from the interests that the Court confronted in the  
earlier FHA cases.71 As a result, the city’s injuries were “so 
marginally related to” the purposes of the FHA that they fell 
outside the zone of interests.72 
On the second standing question, whether there was an 
 
 
63. Id. (citing Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)). 
64. Id. (quoting Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 10 
(2010)). 
65. Id. (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268). 
66. Id. at 1301. 
67. Id. at 1306. 
68. Id. at 1306 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
69. Id. at 1307–08 (first citing Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP., 562 
U.S. 170, 173, 175–78 (2011); then citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1388–89 (2014)). 
70. Id. at 1308 (quoting Thompson, 562 U.S. at 176). 
71. Id. at 1309. 
72. Id. at 1308. 
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adequate causal link between the misconduct and the injury, 
Justice Thomas concurred with the majority, agreeing that proof 
that an injury was “foreseeable” was insufficient to satisfy the 
proximate cause requirement for FHA claims.73 In his view, the 
relationship between the banks’ discrimination and the injury to 
the city was “exceedingly attenuated,”74 and, as a result, there 
was “little doubt that neither Miami nor any similarly situated 
plaintiff c[ould] satisfy the rigorous standard that the Court 
adopt[ed].”75 Absent an adequate causation allegation, Justice 
Thomas would have dismissed the case, rather than remanding, 
because “the Court of Appeals has no advantage over us in 
evaluating the complaint’s proximate-cause theory.”76 
III. ANALYSIS 
City of Miami was lauded by civil rights advocates as an 
important victory and, at first glance, that enthusiasm is justified: 
the Court continues to recognize that a broad range of injuries and 
parties are within the “zone of interests” protected by the FHA, 
and the Court gave the city a chance to prove sufficient causation 
on remand.77 If Miami and other municipalities are eventually 
successful at trial, banks would be on the hook for some of the 
broad-ranging consequences of the rapacious lending that played 
an important role in the Great Recession that began in 2008.78 
This is especially important given the failure of the federal 
government to pursue criminal sanctions against the corporate 
 
73. Id. at 1311. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, An Important Victory for Civil Rights, 
AM. CONST. SOC’Y (May 2, 2017), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/an- 
important-victory-for-civil-rights (examining how the City of Miami ruling is 
a win for the Fair Housing Act); Phillip S. Stein & James J. Ward, Supreme 
Court   Ruling Permits  City Lawsuits against Banks to Proceed, BILZEN 
SUMBURG’S MORTGAGE CRISIS AND FIN. SERV. WATCH (May 1, 2017), 
http://www.financialserviceswatchblog.com/2017/05/supreme-court-ruling- 
permits-city-lawsuits-against-banks-under-fha-to-proceed/#more-4484 (“This 
is an extremely important decision.”). 
78. See Kat Aaron, Predatory lending: A decade of warnings, CTR. FOR 
PUB. INTEGRITY (May 19, 2014, 12:19 PM), https://www.publicintegrity.org/ 
2009/05/06/5452/predatory-lending-decade-warnings (explaining that 
subprime lenders earned enormous profits making mortgages to people who 
clearly could not afford them). 
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chieftains who oversaw the reckless lending.79 
Permitting local governments to sue for discriminatory 
lending is important for practical reasons: few minority home 
seekers harmed by the banks’ misconduct could be expected to 
navigate the chaos of a foreclosure, recognize that the loans they 
took out were based upon discriminatory lending, and manage to 
file suit within the FHA’s short two-year statute of limitations.80 
Even if they could, it is undoubtedly difficult to find attorneys 
willing to take on the financial burden of retaining the expert 
witnesses needed to develop the technical and fact-intensive proof 
showing that banking behemoths engaged in a pattern of 
discrimination that harmed the tax base and increased the cost of 
government services.81 On the other hand, municipal government 
plaintiffs are in a much better position to deter bank misconduct 
through civil litigation. First, governments are less susceptible to 
statute of limitations defenses because the lost tax revenues and 
higher costs continue for many years after the discriminatory 
lending.82 Second, municipalities may take a page from the 
playbook of the states that won billions of dollars from the tobacco 
industry by partnering with powerhouse personal injury lawyers 
 
79. Patrick Radden Keefe, Why Corrupt Bankers Avoid Jail, NEW 
YORKER (July 31, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/ 
2017/07/31/why-corrupt-bankers-avoid-jail (discussing why banks and 
financial institutions were “too big to jail” despite the widespread wrongdoing 
that led to the Great Recession); see generally JESSE EISINGER, THE 
CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FAILS TO PROSECUTE 
EXECUTIVES (Simon & Schuster, 2017). 
80. See Alex Gano, Note, Disparate Impact and Mortgage Lending: A 
Beginner’s Guide, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1156, 1158 (2017). 
81. See Andrew Lichtenstein, Note, United We Stand, Disparate We Fall: 
Putting Individual Victims of Reverse Redlining in Touch with Their Class, 
43 LOY. L. REV. 1339, 1367 (2010) (discussing the challenges faced by 
individuals who may have a bona fide predatory lending claim, including the 
difficulty of identifying misconduct in a timely manner because of  its 
subtlety, the “isolation of subprime communities,” informational asymmetries 
and financial illiteracy of borrowers, a pleading standard that requires 
information unavailable to plaintiffs and their lawyers without filing a claim, 
and the need to retain and pay for expert witnesses). 
82. See Gano, supra note 80, at 1153 (suggesting that cities can avoid 
statute of limitations defenses by taking advantage of the continuing 
violation doctrine). The impact of the foreclosure crisis upon municipalities 
kept renewing itself with each new property tax shortfall and increase in 
costs of services, so government plaintiffs had a longer time to file claims 
than individual homeowners. See id. 
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who have the staff and war chests to stand up to the titans of 
finance.83 
Nevertheless, a closer look at the causation aspect of City of 
Miami suggests that such rosy conclusions may be unjustified, 
and in fact raises the distinct possibility that the era of generous 
grants of standing under the FHA is coming to a close.84 
A. Causation Conundrum 
While the Court split 5–3 in favor of the city on the first 
standing issue—whether the sweeping view of FHA standing 
recognized in Trafficante, Gladstone, and Havens remains good 
law—on the second issue, all of the justices endorsed a “direct 
causation” test, rejecting the more generous foreseeability  
analysis used by the Court of Appeals.85 In fact, Justice Thomas, 
in concurrence on the causation issue, not only agreed that 
directness was the proper test, but would have applied it to the 
facts and dismissed the case entirely, rather than remanding as 
 
 
83. See Margaret A. Little, A Most Dangerous Indiscretion: The Legal, 
Economic, and Political Legacy of the Governments’ Tobacco Litigation, 33 
CONN. L. REV. 1143, 1147–49 (2001) (detailing how the alliance between 
states and the “elite” of the plaintiffs’ bar provided the necessary resources to 
take on “Big Tobacco”); Gregory W. Traylor, Note, Big Tobacco, Medicaid- 
Covered Smokers, and the Substance of the Master Settlement Agreement, 63 
VAND. L. REV. 1081, 1093–98 (2010); see also Jef Feeley & John Lauerman, 
Opioid Costs Push Struggling States to Dust Off Tobacco Strategy, 
BLOOMBERG  (June  14,  2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2017-06-14/opioid-costs-push-struggling-states-to-dust-off-tobacco- 
strategy (quoting the author of this article that governments are hiring 
private firms to seek damages from opioid manufacturers). 
84. Of course, as a decision construing a federal statute, City of Miami 
can be overturned by Congress and the President, a distinct possibility when 
both branches are controlled by Republicans. See Roger Clegg, Silver Linings 
Playbook: “Disparate Impact” and the Fair Housing Act, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. 
REV. 165, 186 (2014–2015) (urging Congress to amend the FHA to overrule 
Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. 
Ct. 2507 (2015), which had approved “disparate impact” claims by plaintiffs); 
see also Protect Local Independence in Housing Act of 2015: Hearing on H.R. 
3145 Before the H. of Rep., 114th Cong. (2015). The Court’s decision in 
Inclusive Cmtys. is discussed infra at notes 172–75, and accompanying text. 
85. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1312 (2017) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting and concurring). Justice Thomas’  opinion  agreed 
with the majority that proof of “foreseeability” was not sufficient. Id. at 1311 
(“Although I disagree with its zone-of-interests holding, I agree with the 
Court’s conclusions about proximate cause.”). 
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the majority directed.86 
It is not surprising that all of the justices read the FHA to 
require a meaningful causal link between the statutory violation 
and injury to the plaintiff; this is a bedrock principle of tort law, 
and FHA claims draw from the common law of torts.87 Indeed, 
“[n]o serious question exists that some limit on the scope of 
liability for tortious conduct that causes harm is required.”88 In 
the context of common law tort actions, judges primarily, but not 
exclusively, look to “proximate cause” for such a limitation.89 But 
whatever the terminology,90 the resulting doctrinal mess has been 
lamented by the great treatise writers,91 the American Law 
Institute,92 and the Court itself,93 and City of Miami did nothing 
 
86. Id. There is no way that the city could satisfy the “rigorous standard 
for proximate cause that the Court adopts and leaves to the Court of Appeals 
to apply” because the link between the alleged FHA violation and its asserted 
injuries was “exceedingly attenuated.” Id. 
87. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1305. 
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010); accord W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 264 (West Pub. Co., 5th ed. 1984) (“Some 
boundary must be set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon the 
basis of some social idea of justice or policy.”). 
89. Some courts limit liability by modifying the duty that the defendant 
owed the plaintiff. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & 
EMOT. HARM § 29 cmt. c. The warring opinions in the classic case of Palsgraf 
v. Long Island Railroad Co. reflect this divide, as Chief Judge Cardozo opted 
for a duty analysis, while Judge Andrews dissented on the basis of proximate 
cause. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR 
PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 cmt. f. Cabining liability via limited duty rules is 
discussed in more detail infra at notes 113–29. 
90. Jessie Allen, The Persistence of Proximate Cause: How Legal Doctrine 
Thrives on Skepticism, 90 DEN. L. REV. 77, 82 (2012) (“All three Restatements 
of Torts have presented traditional proximate cause doctrines as deeply 
vexed.”). 
91. KEETON ET AL., supra note 88, at 263 (“There is perhaps nothing in 
the entire field of law which has called forth more disagreement, or upon 
which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion. Nor, despite the  
manifold attempts which have been made to clarify the subject, is there yet 
any general agreement as to the best approach.” (citation omitted)). 
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 
cmt. b (“‘[P]roximate cause’ is a poor [term] to describe limits on the scope of 
liability.”). 
93. CSX Trans., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2645 (2011) (Roberts, 
J., dissenting) (“The plurality breaks no new ground in criticizing the variety 
of formulations of the concept of proximate cause; courts, commentators, and 
first-year law students have been doing that for generations. But it is often 
easier to disparage the product of centuries of common law than to devise a 
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to fix the doctrinal confusion. 
The Court had a range of options at its disposal, drawn from 
precedents both venerable—like Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad 
Co.94—and modern, like the American Law Institute’s 
Restatement (Third) of Torts,95 but two approaches are the most 
common.96 One approach, the “directness” test, focuses on the 
chain of causation that links the defendant’s wrongdoing to the 
plaintiff’s injury and denies compensation for those injuries that 
are separated by one or more “links in a chain of causation” 
because they are deemed “too remote” for recovery.97 The second 
approach considers whether the plaintiff’s injuries were a 
foreseeable consequence of defendant’s wrongdoing, focusing on 
whether the injuries were within the “scope of the risk” the 
defendant created, and allows liability for only those results 
deemed to be “foreseeable.”98 
A classic example of the directness approach is In re Polemis 
and Furness, Withy & Co.99 In Polemis, a cargo sling dislodged a 
wooden plank that a stevedore had negligently placed across the 
hatchway over a ship’s hold.100 The falling plank hit the bottom of 
the ship and caused sparks, which ignited flammables that 
happened to be in the hold, leading to a fire that destroyed the 
ship.101 While a falling plank created a foreseeable risk of hitting 
 
 
plausible substitute.” (citations omitted)). This is not just a modern concern. 
See, e.g., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 474 (1876) 
(referring to “the oft-embarrassing question, what is and what is not the 
proximate cause of an injury”). 
94. See 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
95. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM 
§ 29. 
96. See David A. Logan, Masked Media: Judges, Juries, and the Law of 
Surreptitious Newsgathering, 83 IOWA L. REV. 161, 209–220 (1997) 
(discussing proximate cause in greater detail). 
97. Sometimes “direct” is paired with, or replaced by, a requirement that 
the injury be a “natural” or “continuous” result of the  wrongdoing. See 
Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and 
the Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L. Q. 49, 81 (1991); see also Allen, supra 
note 90, at 84. 
98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 
cmt. e, at 499–500 (“Courts have increasingly moved toward adopting a 
foreseeability test for scope of liability in negligence cases.”). 
99. See In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., (1921) 3 K.B. 560 (C.A.). 
100. Id. at 560. 
101. Id. 
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any sailor standing below, it was highly unlikely to cause a fire.102 
The court held that the fact that a fire was unforeseeable did not 
preclude recovery because the fire was caused directly by the 
falling plank—that is, without any significant intervening cause 
or links in the chain of causation.103 
Some courts in the United States adopted this “directness” 
test for limiting liability,104 which is attractive because of its 
apparent simplicity: look to the unassailable facts of nature to 
identify the “links in the chain,” and recovery is denied if there are 
“too many.”105 History, however, has not been kind to the 
directness test, in Great Britain or in the United States. 
The Polemis decision was considered and rejected in Overseas 
Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. (The Wagon 
Mound I).106 In The Wagon Mound I, the crew of an oil tanker 
negligently allowed furnace oil to leak into a harbor, where it 
flowed to and under the plaintiff’s dock 600 feet away.107 
Workmen were using torches to repair the dock, and their falling 
molten metal ignited cotton waste floating on the oil.108  The 
waste acted as a wick, which ignited the oil and burned the 
dock.109 The Wagon Mound I court repudiated the “direct 
causation” rule of Polemis, and adopted a limitation on liability 
based on the foreseeability of the risk.110  According to the court,  
it is unfair to saddle a defendant—even a culpable one—with 
liability for an unforeseeable kind of harm, even though a harmful 
consequence of an entirely different kind was readily 
 
 
 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM 
§ 29 reps.’ note at 511 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (collecting cases). 
105. See Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1062 (N.Y. 
2001) (explaining that victims of handgun violence cannot sue gun 
manufacturers because the “connection between defendants, the criminal 
wrongdoers and plaintiffs is remote, running through several links in a chain 
consisting of at least the manufacturer, the federally licensed distributor or 
wholesaler, and the first retailer.”). 
106. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. (The 
Wagon Mound I) [1961] AC 388 (HL) 389 (appeal taken from N.S.W.). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
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foreseeable.111 The court elaborated that limiting liability to 
foreseeable consequences: 
accords with . . . the general public sentiment of moral 
wrongdoing for which the offender must pay. It is a 
departure from this sovereign principle if liability is made 
to depend solely on the damage being the “direct” or 
“natural” consequence of the precedent act. Who knows or 
can be assumed to know all the processes of nature?112 
Limiting liability based upon notions of directness—the test 
adopted by all of the justices in City of Miami—has been harshly 
criticized by scholars,113 rejected by the American Law Institute 
in all three of the Torts Restatements,114 and increasingly 
disdained by courts.115 The primary flaw was identified by the 
court in Wagon Mound I: whether a result was caused directly 
lacks a logical link to the justification for holding a defendant 
liable in the first instance, and instead invites metaphysical 
musings about the workings of nature.116 The directness test is 
also easily manipulated by a judge who wishes to constrict (or 
expand) the scope of liability, because deciding how many links is 
“too many” is a subjective enterprise.117 The directness test is 
 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 426. 
113. Adding the locutions “natural” and “probable” does not fix the 
problem. See Laurence H. Eldredge, Culpable Intervention as Superseding 
Cause, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 123 (1937) (“Nor is clarity attained by the 
repetitious utterance of a ritualistic formula about ‘natural and probable 
consequences.’”); ROBERT E. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 26– 
28 (1963) (criticizing the “natural and probable” test). 
114. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 
reps.’ note (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
115. Id. (collecting cases). 
116. See Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. (The 
Wagon Mound I) [1961] AC 388 (HL) 425 (appeal taken from N.S.W.). Thus, 
the direct test denies liability for injuries that are caused by a culpable 
defendant regardless of whether the particular outcome was within the scope 
of the risk associated with defendant’s wrongdoing, as long as it was caused 
“directly.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 reps.’ note, cmt. e (“One major 
problem with the ‘natural and continuous’ language is that it fails to confront 
the essential concern of the proximate-cause limitation: actors should not be 
held liable when the risk-producing aspects of their conduct cause harm other 
than that which was risked by the tortious conduct.”). 
117. See Frank J. Vandall, Duty: The Continuing Vitality of Dean Green’s 
Theory, 15 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 343, 344 (1995); see also JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG 
& BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: TORTS 
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also confusing to the extent that it suggests that proximate cause 
is only present when the wrongdoing is “close in space or time to 
the plaintiff’s harm.”118 As William Prosser observed decades ago, 
direct causation is an “[a]rtificial” test, purporting to fix liability 
by reference to “a defendant [who] acts upon a set stage” because 
it offers “a mechanical solution of a problem which is primarily 
and essentially one of policy.”119 Finally, the directness test is 
fatally flawed because it fails to provide a candid discussion of the 
competing values at stake.120 As a leading treatise puts it, scope  
of liability issues “call for judgments, not juggernauts of logic.”121 
With such an impressive array of authorities rejecting a 
directness test, one can wonder why a unanimous Court rescued a 
discredited approach from the slag heap of history. The  most 
likely explanation is that the Court felt that the foreseeability test 
adopted by the Court of Appeals provided insufficient protection to 
lenders facing potentially sweeping FHA liability: the city could 
convincingly argue that sophisticated financial players knew, or 
should have known, that widespread predatory lending would not 
only harm borrowers but also the communities that the borrowers 
lived in. Stated differently, if a bank made thousands of 
discriminatory loans despite knowing that many of the borrowers 
were at high risk of foreclosure, then decreased property tax 
revenues and increased need for city services were clearly 
foreseeable and within the scope of the risk created by these 
 
104, 106 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2010) (explaining that the directness test is of 
limited use as an analytical tool because whether an injury had been “directly” 
caused by the defendant’s misconduct is not something that can be 
determined with precision). 
118. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 
cmt. b. 
119. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 304 (3d ed. 
1964). 
120. LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 196 (1927) (arguing 
that limitation of liability should not be achieved by resort to “metaphysical” 
concepts like “directness” or “foreseeability,” but rather by a forthright 
balancing of various public policy considerations). The shape-shifting nature 
of proximate cause was recognized by Judge Andrews in his dissent in 
Palsgraf, 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). For Judge 
Andrews, proximate cause involved “question[s] of fair judgment” that lead, 
at best, not to a clear rule but only to “an uncertain and wavering line” that 
would yield “practical” results “in keeping with the general understanding of 
mankind.” Id. 
121. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 181, 447 (2000). 
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practices. Because the city itself was not subject to 
discrimination,122 requiring proof of a “direct link” between the 
wrong and the harm (instead of or in addition to foreseeability),123 
provides defendants considerably more robust protection from 
liability.124 
Unfortunately, the opinions of Justices Breyer and Thomas 
did not make explicit why such protection was important, but the 
briefs of the parties and amici certainly did, underscoring that 
Miami’s claim for damages was only one of many pending claims 
brought by cities against lending institutions that engaged in 
similar predatory behavior.125 These briefs also warned that a 
victory for the city would expose lending institutions across the 
country to massive liability.126 Such “floodgates” or “unlimited 
liability” concerns have often been the basis for restrictive tort 
rulings,127 whether by a strict application of proximate cause or by 
 
122. See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1300–01 
(2017). 
123. In a few situations, courts provide defendants double protection, 
requiring proof of both directness and foreseeability. See DAN B. DOBBS ET 
AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 704 (2d ed. 2015) (“[I]n certain commercial  harm 
cases . . . the harm must be both foreseeable and direct, dismissing the claim 
for foreseeable harm if the harm was not also ‘direct.’”). 
124. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 
cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
125. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, n.1, City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 
1296 (No. 15-1111) (“At least twelve cities and local governments have 
brought suit . . . .”); id. at 34 (“The new litigation follows the same model: 
brought by outside counsel seeking contingency fees; relying on statistical 
inferences of disparate impact; and demanding ‘hundreds of millions of 
dollars’ in ‘compensatory damages alone,’ plus unspecified punitive damages. 
And this . . . is just one of the many cases now being pursued by municipal 
plaintiffs.”). Accord Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States 
of America As Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2, 13, 16, City of 
Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (No. 15-1111, 15-1112) (arguing that the Court of 
Appeals decision “exposed lending institutions to virtually boundless liability, 
with no limiting principle apparent to provide even a modicum of 
predictability or proportionality;” affirming the Court of Appeals would 
“accelerate the deluge of litigation” and be an insufficient response to the 
“rising tide of municipal suits”). 
126. Brief for the Petitioners at 12, City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (No. 15-
1111, 15-1112) (“the potential liability that lenders face under the Eleventh 
Circuit’s ruling is breathtaking”). 
127. See Catherine M. Sharkey, The Remains of the Citadel (Economic 
Loss Rule in Products Cases), 100 MINN. L. REV. 1845, 1870–71 (2016) (“The 
floodgates concern is by no means unique to the realm of economic losses due 
to defective products. Indeed, it is a common fear whenever a tort right is 
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limiting the duty owed.128 These concerns were not prominent in 
either of the Court’s opinions, with Justice Breyer only blandly 
observing that the directness test took into consideration “what is 
administratively possible and convenient”;129 even more 
surprisingly, Justice Thomas failed to even raise the sweeping 
economic impact that could result if Miami prevailed. 
The Court could have been more transparent, and convincing, 
if it had eschewed going down the rabbit hole of the directness test 
for proximate cause and instead recognized that claims for lost 
revenue by municipalities are fundamentally different from claims 
brought by the primary beneficiaries of the FHA. People who are 
actually subject to racial discrimination seek to vindicate  
dignitary interests, or “harm to the personality,” like the interests 
in a garden variety civil rights claim.130 Such intangible, non- 
economic interests were at the heart of all of the Court’s previous 
 
 
expanded. The thrust of the floodgates concern is typically dealt with via 
proximate cause limitations.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Robert J. Rhee, A 
Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims, 36 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805, 868–69 (2004) (“When courts refer to ‘infinite’ or ‘unlimited’ 
liability, the references are really shorthand for liability that is grossly 
disproportionate to the underlying culpability.” (footnotes omitted)); 
Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1061 (N.Y. 2001) (finding 
that even though gun manufacturers could foresee that innocent victims 
would be harmed by their products, the potential size of the universe  of 
claims was a basis for denying liability; “[t]his judicial resistance to the 
expansion of duty grows out of practical concerns . . . about potentially 
limitless liability.”). 
128. See Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo (Kinsman II), 388 F.2d 
821, 825 (2d Cir. 1968) (“In the final analysis, the circumlocution whether 
posed in terms of ‘foreseeability,’ ‘duty,’ ‘proximate cause,’ [sic] ‘remoteness,’ 
etc. seems unavoidable.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR 
PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“Some courts use duty 
in situations in which other courts would use proximate cause.”). 
129. Bank of Am. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017). 
130. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 623 
(2d ed. 1993) (explaining that in claims for “dignitary injuries or injuries to 
the personality” the “primary or usual concern is not economic at all, but 
vindication of an intangible right . . . the affront to the plaintiff’s dignity as a 
human being, the damage to his self-image, and the resulting mental 
distress”); see also Colleen P. Murphy, Reviewing Congressionally Created 
Remedies for Excessiveness, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 651, 668 (2012) (“In suits 
involving invasions to dignitary interests (such as reputation and privacy), or 
to civil rights (such as voting rights), courts have allowed damages that 
redress the loss of the right itself . . . [and that] vindicate  noneconomic, 
rather than economic, rights.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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FHA standing decisions. In Trafficante, the injury was to the 
neighbors’ “interracial associations”;131 in Havens, the plaintiffs 
sought damages for the racial discrimination actually experienced 
by the testers and the harm to individual members of the civil 
rights group who could not “live in an integrated community”;132 
and the plaintiffs in Gladstone claimed harm to the village’s 
interest in “racial balance and stability” and to the right of the 
village’s residents to “select housing without regard to race,” along 
with the “social and professional benefits of living in an integrated 
society.”133 While the complaint in Havens also sought damages 
for the cost of investigating discrimination134 and the plaintiffs in 
Gladstone included an allegation of a “significant reduction in 
property values [that] directly injures a municipality by 
diminishing its tax base,”135 the gravamen of all of the relevant 
precedents was injury to non-economic harms. 
As a result, judicial clarity would have been better served by 
an opinion that recognized that the core purpose of the FHA was 
to protect those who experience dignitary harm as the result of 
discrimination. Such a forthright approach to what the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts calls the “scope of liability” problem 
was perhaps best explained by Judge Andrews in his famous 
dissent in Palsgraf: “What we do mean by the word ‘proximate’ is 
that, because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of 
justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events 
beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is  practical  
politics.”136 
 
 
131. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205, 209–10 (1972). 
132. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 369 (1982). 
133. Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 92 (1979). 
134. Havens, 455 U.S. at 368. 
135. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 95. 
136. 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). Leading 
scholars have endorsed such an approach. See, e.g., DOBBS, THE LAW OF 
TORTS, supra note 121, at § 181, 446, 447 (“Judgments about proximate cause 
are not precise, but, at least roughly speaking, they reflect the ideas of justice 
as well as practicality . . . . The proximate cause rules give us the language of 
argument and direct the thought that is brought to bear when the connection 
between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s injury seems tenuous. 
The rules call for judgments, not juggernauts of logic.”); KEETON ET AL., supra 
note 88, at § 44, 301 (“[T]he problem is not primarily one of causation at all, 
since it does not arise until cause in fact is established. It is rather one of the 
policy as to imposing legal responsibility.”). 
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If the justices adopted such a candid approach in City of 
Miami, the opinions would have expressly recognized that the lost 
tax revenues and increased municipal expenses are analogous to 
the many cases in which courts have aggressively limited damage 
recoveries when the defendant’s misconduct causes economic 
harm, but no injury to the plaintiff’s person or property.137 This 
“economic loss rule” is long-standing and primarily based upon the 
fear of massive liability and the risk that damages awards could 
bankrupt defendants that provide valuable services to our 
society.138 Courts cite the possible “domino effect,”139 because of 
the risk that civil actions for economic harm may create liability 
“in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an 
indeterminate class.”140 So, for example, when a utility’s gross 
misconduct caused a massive blackout that harmed millions of 
people and businesses in New York City, the court sharply 
restricted the availability of damages.141 Similarly, courts have 
placed strict limitations upon the liability of some service 
providers, like lawyers and stock advisors, because of the way in 
 
 
 
137. See Robert L. Rabin, Respecting Boundaries and the Economic Loss 
Rule in Tort, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 857, 864 (2006); Vincent R. Johnson, The 
Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
523, 529 (2009); Eileen Silverstein, On Recovery in Tort for Pure Economic 
Loss, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 403, 405–07 (1999). 
138. See DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 121, at § 452, 1283 (courts 
sharply limit the scope of recovery for pure economic harm because “financial 
harm tends to generate other financial harm endlessly and often in many 
directions.”). These liability-limiting doctrines generally apply when the 
defendant is guilty of “mere negligence.” See Rhee, supra note 127, at 868–69 
(“When courts refer to ‘infinite’ or ‘unlimited liability,’ the references are 
really shorthand for liability that is grossly disproportionate to the  
underlying culpability.”). However, Strauss involved gross negligence and so 
recognizes that limitations may be appropriate even when the defendant, like 
the lenders in City of Miami, were guilty of highly culpable  conduct. See infra 
note 141 and accompanying text. 
139. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS § 41.7, 1071–72 (2000); 
David R. Owen, Recovery for Economic Loss under U.S. Maritime Law: Sixty 
Years under Robins Dry Dock, 18 J. MAR. L. & COM. 157, 163 (1987). 
140. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931). 
141. Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 38 (N.Y. 1985) (limiting 
liability to those who suffered some physical harm or who were in a 
contractual relationship with the utility); see also Robins Dry Dock & Repair 
Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 304 (1927) (placing limits on liability where 
misfeasance causes purely economic harm). 
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which economic losses can “ripple” through the economy.142 
Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States has rejected tort 
recoveries for harms that are purely economic despite provable 
misconduct.143 
Briefs filed in support of the defendants in City of Miami 
drove home that a decision for the city meant that lenders across 
the country would face sweeping and perhaps economically 
ruinous liability.144 They also identified other possible 
repercussions even if lenders could avoid bankruptcy from FHA 
claims brought by hundreds of municipalities: if loans to minority 
home seekers can be the basis of liability to governments, then 
lenders would be exposed to “legal risks disproportionate to any 
commercial gain they might recoup” from making loans, and thus, 
may react by “offering fewer loan products suitable for low-income 
individuals, thus reducing the credit options available to less- 
qualified borrowers.”145 
It would seem that this line of argument would have been the 
better course in City of Miami, rather than remanding  and 
hurling the lower courts into the thicket of proximate causation. 
Such a forthright approach has the added benefit of providing a 
roadmap for Congress if there is a move to amend the FHA to 
 
142. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982) (“In the 
absence of direct guidance from Congress, and faced with the claim that a 
particular injury is too remote from the alleged violation to warrant § 4 
standing, the courts are thus forced to resort to an analysis no less elusive 
than that employed traditionally by courts at common law with respect to the 
matter of ‘proximate cause.’”); see also David B. Lytle & Beverly Purdue, 
Antitrust Target Area under Section 4 of the Clayton Act: Determination of 
Standing in Light of the Alleged Antitrust Violation, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 795, 
796–802 (1976) (noting that, because antitrust violations, like tortious acts, 
may result in “virtually endless repercussions,” a sense of fairness and 
proportionality led courts to impose this limitation on § 4 recovery); Pegeen 
Mulhern, Comment, Marine Pollution, Fishers, and the Pillars of the Land: A 
Tort Recovery Standard for Pure Economic Losses, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 85, 122 (1990) (“A predictable system of compensation is critical to the 
financial stability of many coastal communities . . . [to avoid] the ripple effect 
through [their] econom[ies] . . . .”). 
143. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 876 
(1986) (rejecting a tort claim for economic damages arising out of poor 
performance of a product). 
144. See supra text accompanying notes 125, 126. 
145. Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8–9, Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of 
Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017). 
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overrule one or more of the sweeping interpretations given to the 
statute by the Court decades ago.146 
B. The Roles of Judge and Jury 
Another interesting aspect of the majority opinion in City of 
Miami was the decision to remand for fact-finding, despite the 
justices’ obvious skepticism that the city will be able to prove that 
its fiscal harm was the “direct result” of misconduct by the 
lenders.147 The hornbook rule instructs that whether a particular 
wrong is considered a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury is 
an issue of fact to be decided by the jury, unless the trial judge 
determines that no reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff.148 
However, courts have adopted a different approach to the 
apportionment of responsibility between judge and jury when the 
plaintiff’s claim diverges from the model of the classic personal 
injury action, as when a plaintiff alleges no injury to her person or 
property but nevertheless can show economic or emotional 
harm.149 
So for example, the rule limiting recovery for claims of “pure 
economic harm,” raises an issue of law for the court, but operates 
in much the same liability-limiting way as proximate cause, which 
is generally an issue of fact for the jury.150 Similarly, when a 
bystander witnesses a terrible accident and suffers severe 
emotional distress, many courts have adopted specific rules that 
 
146. See Jamal Greene, Maximinimalism, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 637 
(2016); Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by 
the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. L. REV. 181, 222 (2009). 
147. See City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1301, 1306; id. at 1311 (Thomas, J. 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
148. See DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS, supra note 139, at 292 
(“Although judges are not empowered to decide the factual disputes in a case, 
they are definitely empowered to conclude that there is no evidence at all and 
equally empowered to conclude that the evidence is so weak that reasonable 
people could not accept it as sufficient to prove the plaintiff’s case.”); W. 
Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671, 729 
(2008) (“Nevertheless, courts appropriately rule as a matter of law on factual 
matters, including whether the defendant acted negligently or whether there 
is proximate cause when no reasonable jury could find otherwise.”). 
149. See Level 3 Commc’ns v. Liberty Corp., 535 F.3d 1146, 1162 (10th 
Cir. 2008) (applying Colorado law). 
150. Id. at 1162–63; Eddward P. Ballinger, Jr. & Samuel A. Thumma,   
The Continuing Evolution of Arizona’s Economic Loss Rule, 39 ARIZ. ST. L. 
REV. 535, 563 (2007). 
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require the trial judge to dismiss the claim regardless of whether  
a reasonable jury could find that the bystander’s injury was 
“foreseeable” or “proximate.”151 As the most recent Restatement 
(Third) of Torts observed, “[g]enerally, no- or limited-duty rules 
have been employed to limit liability for other harms, such as 
economic loss, for which tort law has historically provided less 
protection.”152 If Justice Breyer had recognized that the city’s 
claim was, in essence, one for “pure economic harm,” there would 
have been no need to tax the parties, the district and circuit 
courts, and a jury with a remand that requires the parties to 
develop complex proof and the jury to evaluate sophisticated data, 
especially given the strong suggestion in the majority opinion that 
the ultimate result on remand will be dismissal.153 Alternatively, 
Justice Breyer could have joined Justice Thomas, who considered 
the same evidence and concluded that no reasonable jury could 
find a sufficiently close link between any bank misconduct and 
Miami’s injury.154 
Palsgraf is again instructive regarding the question of the 
respective roles of judge and jury.155 In his majority opinion 
denying liability, Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo focused on 
whether the defendant railroad owed a duty to the plaintiff, who 
was standing on the defendant’s platform, but “many feet away” 
 
 
151. See Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 828 (Cal. 1989) (holding that a 
plaintiff cannot recover for the negligent infliction of emotional distress 
arising from witnessing serious physical harm to another unless the plaintiff 
is “closely related” to the other victim, even if the emotional distress was 
genuine and severe and the result is “arbitrary”); see also DOBBS ET AL., 
HORNBOOK ON TORTS, supra note 139, at 718 (“Regardless of foreseeable and 
actual emotional harm to the plaintiff, plaintiff would be denied recovery 
under [California’s] new rule unless she was actually present and witnessed 
the injury or threat to a close relation.”). 
152. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
153. See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017). 
154. Neither opinion recognized another problem with asking lay jurors to 
apply a directness test for proximate cause: even properly instructed about 
the law, jurors remain confused about the legal standard. See supra text 
accompanying notes 73, 74, 75, 76; Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, 
Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury 
Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306, 1353 (1979) (finding that 23% of jurors 
understood “proximate” cause as “approximate” cause, meaning “estimated 
cause” or some other misconception). 
155. 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928). 
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from a negligently caused explosion.156 He argued that this 
question should be resolved by the judge as a matter of duty, and 
thus an issue of law, avoiding proximate cause, typically 
considered an issue for the jury.157 This act of judicial 
transubstantiation shifted the decision making from the jury to 
the judge. Judge Andrews and two of his colleagues vigorously 
disagreed, insisting that the trial judge had been correct to submit 
the issue to the jury.158 
The American Law Institute has recognized the 
Cardozo/Andrews debate as a “tension in tort law about the proper 
balance between duty rules and proximate-cause limits to 
circumscribe appropriately the scope of liability.”159 The 
Restatement (Third) of Torts elaborates: 
Duty is a question of law for the court . . . while scope of 
liability, although very much an evaluative matter, is 
treated as a question of fact . . . Hence, duty is a 
preferable means for addressing limits on liability when 
those limitations are clear, are based upon relatively 
bright lines, when they are of general application, when 
they do not usually require resort to disputed facts in a 
case, when they implicate policy concerns that may not be 
fully appreciated by a jury deciding a specific case, and 
when they are employed in cases in which early 
resolution of liability is particularly desirable.160 
The policies identified in the Restatement that support a 
 
156. Id. at 99–100. 
157. Id. at 101 (“The law of causation, remote or proximate, is thus  
foreign to the case before us. The question of liability is always anterior to 
the question of the measure of the consequences that go with liability. If 
there is no tort to be redressed, there is no occasion to consider what damage 
might be recovered if there were a finding of a tort.”). 
158. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 105 (Andrews, J., dissenting) (“Under these 
circumstances I cannot say as a matter of law that the plaintiff’s injuries  
were not the proximate result of the negligence.”); see William E. Crawford & 
David J. Shelby II, Time Frame Torts, 53 LA. L. REV. 1011, 1023 (1993) (“This 
is all definitively treated in Palsgraf; Cardozo’s majority opinion represents 
the determination of the scope of duty as a question of law . . . and Andrews’ 
dissent represents the classic application of proximate cause as an issue of 
fact for the jury.”). 
159. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 
(AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
160. Id. 
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preference for duty rules in some contexts are tailor-made for City 
of Miami. First, a holding that lenders have no duty to 
municipalities for the impact of discrimination on government 
coffers provides a “bright-line rule” of “general application” that 
does not require the consideration, let alone the resolution, of 
“disputed facts.”161 Instead, the majority’s decision to remand 
invites the parties and the court to wade into complex factual 
matters, for example, how much of the harm to the city’s tax base 
was due to foreclosures caused by discrimination, as opposed to 
other factors idiosyncratic to both individual borrowers and to the 
economy more generally. Similarly, on remand, the parties may 
have to adduce proof of how much of the city’s increased municipal 
costs were due to foreclosures on minority borrowers and how 
much was caused by other economic factors. Second, a no-duty 
determination would encourage a court to focus explicitly on 
“policy concerns,” and how a string of substantial judgments 
against lenders might have catastrophic impact on the local, 
regional, and national economy. There is also risk that a jury 
could be influenced by the realization that a substantial verdict  
for the plaintiff could lead to lower local taxes. And, finally, early 
resolution of complex economic cases like those presented in City 
of Miami means less of a burden on judges and juries. 
Additional support for approaching FHA claims by 
municipalities as a matter of law comes from how the common law 
resolves scope of liability issues when a party attempts to use a 
violation of a criminal statute in a negligence action. Under the 
doctrine of negligence per se, if the harm the plaintiff suffered was 
within the class of harms that the statute was intended to 
prevent, and the plaintiff was in the class of people intended to be 
protected by the statute, then the judge determines negligence as 
a matter of law, usurping the traditional role of the jury.162 This 
requires the judge to identify the legislative purpose for passing 
the law, and then determine how close the legislative purpose is to 
the plaintiff’s injury.163 As the most recent Restatement 
recognizes, this “statutory-purpose” doctrine “resembles the scope 
 
161. Id. 
162. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14 
cmt. c; KEETON ET AL., supra note 88, at 229–30. 
163. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS, supra note 139, at 256; 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14 cmt. f. 
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of liability  doctrine  that  is  applied  in  ordinary  negligence 
cases . . . .”164 While divining legislative intent may be difficult in 
individual cases,165 this exercise is nevertheless better-suited to a 
judge than a lay jury,166 and further suggests that the remand in 
City of Miami was unwise.167 
C. The End of an Era? 
By selecting “directness” as the analytical framework for 
determining causation, but remanding for application, the Court 
provided municipalities, in theory at least, the chance to prove 
 
 
164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14 
cmt. f; accord DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS, supra note 139, at 326 
(“Proximate cause is part of the language of common law tort analysis that is 
often equivalent to the class of person/type risk or harm analysis in cases of 
statutory violation.”). 
165. See Barbara Kritchevsky, Whose Idea Was It? Why Violations  of 
State Laws Enacted Pursuant to Federal Mandates Should Not Be Negligence 
Per Se, 2009 WISC. L. REV. 693, 724 (“A problem with hinging the 
applicability of negligence per se on legislative intent is that the intent can be 
very difficult to decipher . . . .”); DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS, supra 
note 139, at 256 (“Statutes do not always clearly indicate what class of 
persons and risks they are intended to protect against.”). 
166. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM 
§ 17; see also DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS, supra note 139, at 257 (“The 
best way [for a judge attempting to determine the applicability of a statute for 
the purposes of negligence per se] is by adhering to the foreseeability principle 
that runs through the common law of torts . . . . The standard is also familiar 
to judges and lawyers from the analogous cases of ‘proximate cause.’”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14 
cmt. f (“In determining the purpose of the statute, the court can rely on the 
ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, including the language or text 
of the statutory provision, its location within the larger statutory scheme, the 
more general context of the statute, and indications of specific legislative 
intent.”). 
167. The judicial role in negligence per se cases has been criticized for 
giving too much power to the judge. See Robert F. Blomquist, The Trouble 
with Negligence Per Se, 61 S. C. L. REV. 221, 278 (2009) (“By virtue of the 
negligence per se doctrine, relatively abstract considerations of legislative 
purpose—ungrounded, by definition, in either concrete statutory text or 
concrete specific legislative intent—are ritualistically invoked by judges in a 
highly manipulable process that leads to divergent and unpredictable 
results.”). But proximate cause determinations also arise in uncharted 
waters. See Caroline Forell, The Statutory Duty Action in Tort: A 
Statutory/Common Law Hybrid, 23 IND. L. REV. 781, 797 (1990) (finding that 
negligence per se can be used by judges to improperly expand judicial 
authority). 
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their allegations and thus have some leverage for settlement.168 
But the language in the majority opinion provides financial 
institutions much less basis for concern than would have been the 
case if foreseeability were the focus on remand.169 From this 
perspective, City of Miami bolsters the reputation of the Roberts 
Court as a friend of big business.170 
If it turns out that City of Miami imposed a “rigorous” 
causation requirement, the result will strike a serious blow in the 
fight to rectify the wide-spread harms caused by predatory 
lending, leaving the task to individual plaintiffs, perhaps 
proceeding via class action.171 In this regard, City of  Miami 
closely resembles a FHA case decided by the Court two years 
previously, Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. 
Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.172 In that 5–4 decision, the 
Court held that plaintiffs could prove housing discrimination by 
adducing proof of “disparate impact.”173 While allowing that 
 
168. See Chris Bruce, Bias Suits against Banks Face Test on Causal  
Links, BLOOMBERG BNA: BANKING DAILY (June 19, 2017), 
https://www.bna.com/bias-suits-against-n73014453561/ (raising the prospect 
of settlement after remand). 
169. Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017) 
(“[F]oreseeability alone does not ensure the close connection that proximate 
cause requires . . . . [The Fair Housing Act] requires ‘some direct relation 
between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.’”). 
170. See J. Mitchell Pickerill & Cornell W. Clayton, The Roberts Court 
and Economic Issues in an Era of Polarization, 67 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 693, 
695 (2017); Adam Winkler, Why Big Business Keeps Winning at the Supreme 
Court, WASH. POST (June 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/posteverything/wp/2017/06/26/why-big-business-keeps-winning-at-the- 
supreme-court/?utm_term=.62bcf032d89f. 
171. Class actions may turn out not to be an option, as the Roberts Court 
has significantly constricted the availability of class actions. See Theodore J. 
Boutrous, Jr. & Bradley J. Hamburger, Three Myths about Wal-Mart Stores v. 
Dukes, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO, 45, 48 (2014) (finding that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct.  2541 
(2011), narrowed the availability of class actions for sex discrimination claims 
and is likely to apply in other contexts); see also Michelle Gallo, Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes: The Fatal Class Action Suit, 20 Dig. NAT’L IT. AM. B. 
ASS’N L.J. 69, 77 (2012) (“This decision reinforced a pattern of the Supreme 
Court rulings making it more challenging for complainants, whether 
employees or consumers, to bring their issues to court.”). 
172. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
173. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 701, 702 (2006) (“Within antidiscrimination law, no theory has 
attracted more attention or controversy than the disparate impact theory, 
which allows proof of discrimination without the need to prove an intent to 
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claim to proceed, the Court sharply constricted the use of 
“disparate impact” by imposing a “robust causality 
requirement.”174 This result appears to be a close cousin of the 
imposition of a directness test in City of Miami: both cases appear 
at first blush to be victories for plaintiffs asserting FHA claims, 
but in both cases, the application of the law to the facts suggests 
that no liability will ultimately be allowed.175 
The stakes were certainly high in City of Miami, as a holding 
for the banks would mean the end of an era of progressive FHA 
holdings, while a decision that lacked a limiting concept could 
have exposed banks to billions of dollars in liability. One can only 
speculate, but perhaps in both City of Miami and Inclusive 
Communities the more progressive justices (Ginsberg, Breyer, 
Sotomayer, and Kagan) were faced with choosing between a 
haircut and a beheading, and they were willing to make 
concessions on causation in order to garner a fifth vote from a 
more moderate colleague (Roberts in City of Miami, and Kennedy 
in Inclusive Communities). 
Such a judicial compromise is suggested by the oral argument 
in City of Miami, when both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Kennedy expressed concern with the practical ramifications of 
permitting suits against banks to proceed.176 By helping Justice 
 
discriminate.”). 
174. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2512; see Clegg, 
supra note 84, at 170–71 (explaining that the majority’s discussion in 
Inclusive Communities, of the need for plaintiffs to satisfy a “robust causality 
requirement,” suggests that the plaintiff’s case may be doomed on remand). 
175. See John L. Ropiequet, Has the US Supreme Court Sounded the 
Death Knell for Fair Lending Cases?, 36 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 
6 (2017) (“This decision [in City of Miami], coupled with the robust causation 
requirement announced in Inclusive Communities, may sound the death knell 
for future fair lending litigation . . . .”). It appears that the causation issue in 
Inclusive Communities concerned whether there was a factual link between 
the defendant’s wrong doing and the plaintiff’s injuries, which, in theory at 
least, is distinguishable from the causation issue in City of Miami, which 
assumed that the plaintiff had adequately pleaded cause-in-fact. See Richard 
W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1740 (1985) (stating 
that confusion is created by failing to distinguish factual causation from 
proximate causation); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR 
PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
176. Amy Howe, Argument analysis: City likely to prevail, one way or 
another, in fair housing case, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 8, 2016, 8:21 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/11/argument-analysis-city-likely-to-prevail- 
one-way-or-another-in-fair-housing-case/. 
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Breyer form a majority, which then pruned rather than overruled 
progressive precedents, Chief Justice Roberts could serve two 
goals. The first would be avoiding a 4–4 split, something he may 
be at pains to avoid.177 Second, a decision that appears consistent 
with progressive precedents deflects the perception that the Court 
engages in overtly “political” behavior like “horse-trading”178— 
though that is a charge that the justices regularly deflect.179 Such 
concern for institutional appearances was prominent in much of 
the analysis of Chief Justice Roberts’ decision to uphold 
Obamacare,180 and could well have been at play in City of Miami. 
This would not be a surprising development, as the 
increasingly conservative justices on the Rehnquist and Roberts 
Courts have had to decide what to do with the liberal decisions of 
 
177. Ilya Shapiro, Introduction, 2016 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1 
(characterizing Chief Justice Roberts as “working hard to craft or facilitate 
narrow rulings and thus avoid 4–4 splits.”). 
178. Jeffrey R. Seul, Settling Significant Cases, 79 WASH. L. REV. 881, 896 
(2004) (“Although negotiation among the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court 
is highly stylized, there is no question that they negotiate. They do  not 
engage in . . . coarse horse-trading . . . ; rather, they ‘accommodate’ their own 
ideological perspectives to others’ perspectives as necessary to substantially 
achieve their own objectives.”); see also Marie A. Failinger, Against Idols: The 
Court as a Symbol-Making or Rhetorical Institution, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. LAW 
367, 374 (2006) (describing the “conspiracy theory” of Supreme Court 
behavior, in which justices make “lofty and objective-sounding arguments 
while secretly they vote according to their own personal interests, prejudices, 
or intuitions about injustice”). 
179. See Garance Franke-Ruta, The Supreme Court Has Solved the Angry 
E-Mail Problem: Justices Only Send Each Other Memos on Paper, THE 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 17, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/ 
2013/10/the-supreme-court-has-solved-the-angry-email-problem-justices-only- 
send-each-other-memos-on-paper/280663/ (“[W]e’re not horse trading. We’re 
not bargaining. We’re reasoning.”); see also Jeffrey Rosen, A Majority of One, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/03/magazine/a- 
majority-of-one.html?mcubz=1 (“[T]here is little lobbying or horse-trading on 
the Rehnquist court.”). 
180. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); see 
also Tonja Jacobi, Obamacare as a Window on Judicial Strategy, 80 TENN. L. 
REV. 763, 763 (2013) (stating that Roberts’ vote upholding the statute was 
predominantly “institutional” rather than “doctrinal,” an effort to insulate   
the Court from the appearance of partisan decision-making immediately 
before a presidential election, to guard his own personal reputation from 
charges of partisan manipulation, and to increase judicial power); Adam 
Liptak, Roberts Shows Deft Hand as Swing Vote on Health Care, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/us/politics/a-defining- 
move-for-chief-justice-roberts.html (“[Roberts] chose compromise, or perhaps 
statesmanship.”). 
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the Warren and Burger Courts; some say that the result has been 
“stealth overruling.”181 A similar strategy was adopted by the 
California Supreme Court when conservative justices replaced 
liberals in the 1980’s:182 a conservative majority would write 
opinions that acknowledged earlier ground-breaking tort decisions 
like Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,183 Dillon v. Legg,184 
Rowland v. Christian, 185 and Tarasoff v. Regents of the University 
of California,186 but nevertheless reached conservative 
 
181. See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With 
Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 1 (2010); Richard 
M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1861, 
1863–64 (2014) (describing criticism of the Roberts Court for “narrowly 
interpreting—but not overruling—precedents in such hot-button areas such as 
abortion, campaign finance, standing, affirmative action, the Second 
Amendment, the exclusionary rule, and Miranda rights”). 
182. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort 
Monster: The American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social 
Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 45–46 (2002) (“In a number of historic firsts, the 
California Supreme Court led the way in carving out new categories of 
plaintiff recovery in nearly every corner of tort law. California recognized 
new remedies for non-pecuniary injuries, loss of consortium, prenatal  
injuries, punitive damages, medical monitoring, wrongful life and wrongful 
birth. Plaintiffs were also permitted to recover against co-defendants under 
the novel theory of concerted action.”). 
183. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (holding that a plaintiff in a products 
liability action need not prove that the defendant was guilty of negligence 
because negligence is irrelevant to a strict liability claim). But see Daly v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1168–69 (Cal. 1978) (refusing to follow the 
logic of Greenman by allowing plaintiff’s fault to reduce or eliminate 
recovery). 
184. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (holding that a bystander to a serious 
physical injury to another person may recover for the negligent infliction of 
emotional distress even if not subject to physical impact or in the zone of 
danger if the injury was “foreseeable”). Dillon was limited in Thing v. La 
Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989) (replacing foreseeability with a rule 
requiring proof of multiple factors). 
185. 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968) (holding that occupiers of premises owe 
a duty of reasonable care to all entrants injured on the premises, even 
trespassers). This generous approach to premises liability did not survive. 
See, e.g., Ky. Fried Chicken of Cal., v. Super. Ct., 927 P.2d 1260, 1270 (Cal. 
1997) (holding that an occupier of premises owes no duty to protect entrants 
on the premises from criminal assaults). 
186. 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976) (holding that, when a therapist 
diagnoses, or reasonably should have diagnosed, that a patient represents a 
threat of serious harm to others, the therapist owes an affirmative duty of 
care to protect a foreseeable victim of that danger). Tarasoff was limited by 
subsequent decisions. See Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 
738 (Cal. 1980) (limiting the class of plaintiffs who can sue therapist for 
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outcomes.187 
CONCLUSION 
While City of Miami and Inclusive Communities allow FHA 
plaintiffs to survive the pleading stage, the fate of the FHA claims 
in lower courts is in doubt if judges heed the Court’s implied 
message that such claims should be viewed through skeptical 
eyes.188 This may mean that both sides will consider settling 
rather than undergoing the expense of a full round of litigation, 
but there is now considerably less pressure on lenders to do so. If, 
however, the end result is something short of a substantial 
financial settlement, then champions of civil rights in general, and 
fair housing in particular, will find that the victory in City of 
Miami was largely illusory.189 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
negligence). 
187. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 182, at 52 (“The principal reason for 
the [California Supreme Court’s] retrenchment has been its change in 
composition with the appointment of more conservative justices.”); Bill Blum, 
Toward a Radical Middle: Has A Great Court Become Mediocre?, 77 A.B.A. J. 
48, 50 (1991) (“In tort law, on the other hand, the [California Supreme Court] 
has embarked on a clear course of cutting back the principles of liability and 
the bases for relief.”); see also Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the 
Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 
604 (1992) (describing how courts can stem the expansion of tort law without 
expressly overruling precedents). 
188. This outcome is even more likely because the Supreme Court has 
tightened pleading requirements in civil actions generally. See Alexander A. 
Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA. L. REV. 2117, 
2118 (2015) (discussing the impact of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Iqbal v. 
Ashcroft, which upended the liberal pleading doctrine that had “remained 
essentially static for five decades”). 
189. Of course, a damages remedy under the FHA does not cure the 
segregating impact of government policies that are race-neutral, like zoning 
regulations that prohibit the building of low-income and moderate-income 
housing in predominantly white neighborhoods. See Sarah Schindler, 
Architectural Exclusion: Discrimination and Segregation Through Physical 
design of the Built Environment, 124 YALE L.J. 1934, 1980 (2015) (“There is 
much evidence to suggest the use of facially race-neutral exclusionary zoning 
as a strategy to further racial homogeneity and to exclude racial minorities.”). 
